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4.1 Introduction
The coming generational storm is arguably the strongest tempest against which cur-
rent and future politicians have to sail. The policy-panacea, however, has not yet been
developed and, maybe even worse, there is no consensus on what the economic con-
sequences of an ageing population actually are. Hence, in this chapter we use a sim-
plified version of the model developed in Chapter 2 to study the macroeconomic con-
sequences of an increase in old age mortality. We introduce a simple Pay-As-You-Go
(PAYG) pension system, which may either be run on a defined benefit (DB) or a de-
fined contribution (DC) basis. In the former case the replacement rate acts as a policy
variable whereas in the latter case the contribution rate is the policy variable. Further-
more, and in contrast to the previous chapters, we let retirement be exogenous, which
allows us to consider the retirement age as a policy variable.
We find that, in principle, ageing is good for economic growth because it increases
the incentive for individuals to save. However, if a defined benefit system is in place
the higher contributions necessary to finance the entitlement of the additional pension-
ers will reduce individual savings and thereby dampen the growth increase following
a longevity shock. In order to circumvent this reduction in growth the government
could opt to introduce a defined contribution system in which the benefits are ad-
justed downward to accommodate the increased dependency ratio. Surprisingly, we
find that if the government increases the retirement age such that the old age depen-
dency ratio remains constant economic growth drops compared to both the defined
benefit and the defined contribution system. This is due to an adverse savings effect
following from the shortened retirement period.
The remainder of this chapter is set-up as follows. The next section introduces the
model and discusses howwe feed in a realistic life-cycle. Section 3 analyses the steady-
state consequences of ageing and provides some policy recommendations. The final
section concludes.
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4.2 Model
We use the model developed in Chapter 2 and extend it to include a public pension
system on the government side but simplify it by making the retirement decision ex-
ogenous on the consumer side. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for a complete de-




We develop the individual’s decision rules from the perspective of birth. Expected
lifetime utility of an individual born at time v is given by:
EΛ (v, v) ≡
∫ v+D¯
v
C(v, τ)1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ
· e−ρ(τ−v)−M(τ−v)dτ, (4.1)
where C (v, τ) is consumption, σ is the intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ > 0), ρ
is the pure rate of time preference (ρ > 0), D¯ is the maximum attainable age for the
agent, and e−M(τ−v) is the probability that the agent is still alive at some future time
τ (≥ v). Here, M(τ − v) ≡
∫ τ−v
0 µ(s)ds stands for the cumulative mortality rate and
µ (s) is the instantaneous mortality rate of an agent of age s.
The agent’s budget identity is given by:
A˙(v, τ) = rA (τ − v) A(v, τ) + w(v, τ)L (v, τ)− C(v, τ) + PR (v, τ) + TR (v, τ) , (4.2)
where A (v, τ) is the stock of financial assets, rA (τ − v) is the age-dependent annu-
ity rate of interest rate, w (v, τ) ≡ E (τ − v)w (τ) is the age-dependent wage rate,
E (τ − v) is exogenous labour productivity, L (v, τ) is labour supply, PR(v, τ) are pay-
ments received from the public pension system, and TR (v, τ) are lump-sum transfers
(see below). Labour supply is exogenous and mandatory retirement takes place at age
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R. Since the time endowment is unity, we thus find:
L (v, τ) =
1 for 0 ≤ τ − v < R0 for R ≤ τ − v < D¯ . (4.3)
There is a simple PAYG pension system which taxes workers and provides benefits
to retirees:
PR (τ) =
−θw (v, τ) for 0 ≤ τ − v < Rζw (τ) for R ≤ τ − v < D¯ (4.4)
where w(τ) is the economy wide wage rate, θ (0 < θ < 1) is the contribution rate and ζ
is the benefit rate (ζ > 0). Under a DC system, θ is exogenous and ζ adjusts to balance
the budget (see below). The opposite holds under a DB system. Finally, we postulate
that lump-sum transfers are age-independent:
TR (v, τ) = z · w (τ) , (4.5)
where z is endogenously determined via the balanced budget requirement of the re-
distribution scheme (see below).
In order to replicate the salient features of the individual life-cycle we add a num-
ber of distinguishing features to our model. As these features have been discussed at
length in Chapters 2-3 we suffice by stating them here and referring the reader to the
previous chapters.
Imperfect annuity markets: The annuity rate of interest facing the agent is given by:
rA (τ − v) ≡ r+ λµ (τ − v) , (for 0 ≤ τ − v < D¯). (4.6)
where r is the real interest rate and λ is a parameter (0 < λ ≤ 1) indicating the degree
of imperfection on the annuity market.
Age-dependent productivity: Labour productivity is hump-shaped over the life-cycle.
A useful parameterization of the productivity profile is:
E (t− v) = α0e
−ζ0(t−v) − α1e
−ζ1(t−v), (for 0 ≤ t− v ≤ D¯), (4.7)
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where αi and ζ i are the parameters governing the curvature of the productivity profile
(see Box 2.1 for details).
Age-dependent mortality: Individual mortality increases over the life-cycle. We as-





, (for 0 ≤ t− v ≤ D¯), (4.8)
where η0 > 1 and η1 > 0 are parameters (see Box 2.2 for details).
The agent chooses time profiles for C (v, τ) and A (v, τ) (for v ≤ τ ≤ v + D¯) in
order to maximize (4.1), subject to (i) the budget identity (4.2), (ii) a transversality
condition, A (v, v+ D¯) = 0, and (iii) the initial asset position at birth, A (v, v) = 0. The
optimal consumption profile for a vintage-v individual of age u (0 ≤ u ≤ D¯) is fully
characterized by the following equations:
























The intuition behind these expressions is as follows. Equation (4.9) is best understood
by noting that the consumption Euler equation resulting from utility maximization
takes the following form:
C˙ (v, τ)
C (v, τ)
= σ · [r− ρ− (1− λ) µ (τ − v)] . (4.12)
By using this expression, future consumption can be expressed in terms of consump-
tion at birth as in (4.9). In the absence of an annuity market imperfection (λ = 1),
consumption growth only depends on the gap between the interest rate and the pure
rate of time preference. In contrast, with imperfect annuities, individual consumption
growth is negatively affected by the mortality rate, a result first demonstrated for the
case with λ = 0 by Yaari (1965, p. 143).
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Equation (4.10) shows that scaled consumption of a newborn is proportional to
scaled human wealth. Finally, equation (4.11) provides the definition of human wealth
at birth. The first term on the right-hand side represents the present value of the time
endowment during working life, using the growth-corrected annuity rate of interest
for discounting. The second term on the right-hand side denotes the present value
of the pension received during retirement. Finally, the third term on the right-hand
side of (4.11) is just the present value of transfers arising from the annuity market
imperfection.
The asset profiles accompanying the optimal consumption plans are given for a
working-age individual (0 ≤ u < R) by:
A (v, v+ u)
w (v)
e−ru−λM(u) = (1− θ)
∫ u
0










and for a retiree (R ≤ u ≤ D¯) by:

















p (v, t)X (v, t) dv, (4.15)
where X (v, t) denotes the variable in question at the individual level, x (t) is the per
capita average value of that same variable, and p (v, t) ≡ βe−pi(t−v)−M(t−v) are the
cohort weights (see Box 2.2 for details).










Pensions and ageing 81
n (t) = n ≡ β
∫ R
0
E (s) e−pis−M(s)ds, (4.17)






















w (t) . (4.18)
Equation (4.16) relates the macroeconomic consumption-wage ratio to the optimally
chosen scaled consumption level by newborns. Since this ratio is time-invariant, per
capita consumption grows at the macroeconomic growth rate g. Equation (4.17) shows
that aggregate per capita labour supply (in efficiency units) is a time-invariant con-
stant. Finally, the growth rate in per capita financial assets is given in equation (4.18).
This expression will be discussed in more detail below.
4.2.2 Loose ends
We assume that the PAYG pension scheme is run on a balanced-budget basis. In view





βe−pis−M(s)ds = θw (t)
∫ R
0
βE (s) e−pis−M(s)ds, (4.19)
where the left-hand side stands for pension payments to retirees and the right-hand
side represents pension contributions by workers. The mandatory retirement age R is
exogenous. Under the assumption of a DC system, θ is also exogenous and ζ adjusts
to balance the budget. The opposite holds under a DB system. In view of (4.19), the
PAYG system does not feature in the expression for aggregate asset accumulation, i.e.
the second line of (4.18) is zero.
Excess profits of annuity firms can be written as follows:
EP (v, t) ≡ (1− λ)
∫ t
t−D¯
p (v, t) µ (t− v) A (v, t) dv. (4.20)
The integral on the right-hand side represents per capita annuitized assets of all indi-
viduals that die in period t. This is the total revenue of annuity firms, of which only a
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fraction λ is paid out to surviving annuitants. The remaining fraction, 1− λ, is excess
profit which is taxed away by the government and disbursed to all households in the
form of lump-sum transfers, i.e. EP (v, t) = TR (v, t). Using (4.5) and (4.20) we find the
implied expression for z:




A (v, v+ u)
w (v)
du. (4.21)
Just as for the PAYG system, the redistribution of excess profits of annuity firms also
debudgets from the asset accumulation equation, i.e. the third line in (4.18) is also zero.
In the absence of government bonds, the capital market equilibrium condition is
given by A (t) = K (t) or, in per capita average terms, by:
a (t) = k (t) , (4.22)
where k (t) ≡ K (t) /P (t) is the per capita stock of capital. As before we easily find:
y (t) = Ω0k (t) , (4.23)
w (t) n (t) = (1− ε) y (t) , (4.24)
where y (t) ≡ Y (t) /P (t) is per capita output. From (4.18)–(4.19), (4.21) and (4.22) we













For convenience, the key equations comprising the general equilibriummodel have
been gathered in Table 1. Equations (T1.1)–(T1.2), (T1.3a)–(T1.3b), (T1.4)–(T1.6), (T1.8)–
(T1.9) restate, respectively, (4.10)–(4.11), (4.13)–(4.14), (4.19), (4.21), (4.25), (4.17), and
(4.16). Equation (T1.7) is obtained by combining (4.23) and (4.24) and noting (4.17).
The model features a two-way interaction between the microeconomic decisions
and the macroeconomic outcomes. Indeed, conditional on the macroeconomic vari-
ables, equations (T1.1)–(T1.3) determine scaled newborn consumption and human
wealth, C (v, v) /w (v) and H (v, v) /w (v) as well as the age profile of scaled assets
A (v, v+ u) /w (v). Conditional on these microeconomic variables, equations (T1.4)–
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(T1.9) determine equilibrium pension payments and transfers, ζ and z, the macroeco-
nomic growth rate, g, the overall wage-capital ratio, w (t) /k (t), aggregate labour sup-
ply, n, and the c (t) /w (t) ratio.
4.2.3 The core model
For the core model we postulate the existence of perfect annuities (PA, with λ = 1)
and parameterized it as follows. The productivity and demographic parameters1 are
taken from the estimates outlined in Chapter 2. We assume that the rate of population
growth is half of one percent per annum (pi = 0.005). For the estimated demographic
process, the demographic steady-state yields a birth rate equal to β = 0.0204. Since
µ¯ ≡ β − pi, this implies that the average mortality rate is µ¯ = 0.0154. The old-age
dependency ratio equals 22.92%. We model an economy with a steady-state capital-
output ratio of 2.5, which is obtained by setting Ω0 = 0.4. The interest rate is five
percent per annum (r = 0.05), the capital depreciation rate is seven percent per annum
(δ = 0.07), and the efficiency parameter of capital is set at ε = 0.3. The steady-state
growth rate is set equal to two percent per annum (g = 0.02). For the intertemporal
substitution elasticity we use σ = 0.7, a value consistent with the estimates reported by
Attanasio and Weber (1995). The rate of pure time preference is used as a calibration
parameter, yielding a value of ρ = 0.0112.
Regarding the PAYG pension systemwe assume that the mandatory retirement age
is set at R = 47 (corresponding with 65 in biological years) and that the pension contri-
bution rate is seven percent of wage income, i.e. θ = 0.07 which roughly corresponds
with the Dutch pension system. The implied pension benefit is determined in general
equilibrium.
Table 4.2(a) reports the main features of the initial steady-state growth path. With
perfect annuities, there are no excess profits of annuity firms and thus no transfers,
i.e. z = 0 in Table 4.2(a). Note also that at retirement age R a vintage-v agent re-
ceives ζw (v+ R) in the form of a pension whereas the last-received wage for this
agent equals E (R)w (v+ R). The replacement rate is thus equal to ζ/E (R) = 0.3189.
We visualize the life-cycle profiles for a number a key variables in Figure 1. The
1Remember that we consider agents from age 18 onward so that amodel age of 0 corresponds to a biological
age of 18.
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A (v, v+ u)
w (v)
e−ru−λM(u) = (1− θ)
∫ u
0





















ζ = θ ·
∫ R







































Definitions: Endogenous are C(v, v)/w(v), H(v, v)/w(v), A(v, v + u)/w(v), ζ, z, g, n,
w(t)/k(t), and c(t)/w(t). Parameters: R retirement age, θ pension contribution rate, birth
rate β, aggregate mortality rate µ¯, population growth rate pi ≡ β − µ¯, imperfection annu-
ities λ, rate of time preference ρ, capital coefficient in the technology ε, scale factor in the












Table 4.2. Quantitative effects
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Case: PA IA PA IA PA IA PA IA
Core cases DC DB RA
C (v, v)
w (v)
0.8534 0.8609 1.0784 1.0785 0.9078 0.9053 0.9329 0.9369
H (v, v)
w (v)
26.5646 27.0207 36.0229 36.2942 30.3246 30.4653 31.1617 31.5282
g (%) 2.00 1.91 3.36 3.27 2.79 2.68 2.39 2.30
n 0.9675 0.9675 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.9589 0.9589
w (t)
k (t)
0.2894 0.2894 0.3410 0.3410 0.3410 0.3410 0.2920 0.2920
c (t)
w (t)
1.0538 1.0570 0.8692 0.8720 0.8861 0.8893 1.0482 1.0514
ζ 0.3632 0.3632 0.1824 0.1824 0.3632 0.3632 0.3632 0.3632
z 0.0200 0.0142 0.0131 0.0185
θ 0.1394 0.1394
R+ 18 75.3 75.3
Notes. PA stands for perfect annuities (λ = 1) and IA denotes imperfect annuities (λ = 0.7). Column (a) is the core model. Column (b) shows
the effects of the annuity market imperfection in the core model. Columns (c)–(d) show the effects of a demographic shock under a DC pension
system. Columns (e)–(f) show the effects under a DB system. In this scenario the tax rate θ adjusts to keep ζ at its pre-shock level. Columns
(g)–(h) show the effects under a retirement age (RA) scenario in which θ and ζ are kept at their pre-shock levels and R is adjusted.
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solid lines are associated with the core model featuring perfect annuities. For ease
of interpretation, the horizontal axes report biological age, u+ 18. Figure 1(a) shows
that with perfect longevity insurance consumption rises monotonically over the life
cycle. This counterfactual result follows readily from (4.12) which for λ = 1 simplifies
to C˙ (v, τ) /C (v, τ) = σ (r− ρ). Figure 1(b) depicts the age profile of scaled financial
assets. At first the agent is a net borrower, i.e. a buyer of life-insured loans. Thereafter
annuity purchases are positive and the profile of assets is bell-shaped. In the absence
of a bequest motive, the agent plans to run out of financial assets at the maximum age
D¯. Figure 1(c) shows the profile of scaled wages over the life cycle. Despite the fact
that individual labour productivity itself is bell-shaped, wages increase monotonically
as a result of ongoing economic growth. Finally, in Figure 1(d) we illustrate the profile
for scaled pension receipts. During the working career these payments are negative
and proportional to scaled wages, whilst they are positive and proportional to the
economy-wide wage rate during retirement.
Despite its simplicity, the model captures some of the main stylized facts regarding
life cycles. Indeed, as is documented by inter alia Huggett (1996), in real life finan-
cial assets typically display a hump-shaped profile and remain non-negative in old
age. The model also features a realistic age profile for labour supply. Indeed, as is
pointed out by McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) (for the United States), labour supply
is constant and age-invariant for most of working life and tapers off rapidly near the
retirement age.
In contrast, the model does not provide a realistic profile for consumption. In
the core model the age profile for consumption is monotonically increasing, whereas
it is hump-shaped in reality. See, for example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) for evidence on the US, and Alessie and de
Ree (2009) for a recent study using Dutch data.
Referring to the consumption Euler equation (4.12) it is clear that an annuity mar-
ket imperfection can account for a hump-shaped pattern of consumption. Indeed,
with 0 < λ < 1 it follows from (4.12) and Figure 1(b) that consumption growth is
positive during the early phase of life because the mortality rate is low, i.e. r − ρ >
(1− λ) µ (u). Toward the end of life, however, the instantaneous death probability
rises sharply, the inequality is reversed, and the optimal consumption profile is down-
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ward sloping.2
In order to quantify and visualize the effects of an annuity market imperfection
we recompute the general equilibrium of the model using the structural parameters
mentioned above but setting λ = 0.7. This degree of annuity market imperfection is in
the order of magnitude found by Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, p. 59). Table 2(b)
reports the quantitative implications of the annuity market imperfection. Two features
stand out. First, in the presence of imperfect annuities excess profits of annuity firms
are positive and transfers are thus strictly positive (z = 0.0200). Each surviving agent
thus receives about two percent of the macroeconomic wage rate in each period in the
form of transfers. Second, the macroeconomic growth rate falls by nine basis points,
from 2 percent to 1.91 percent per annum.
The ultimate effect on newborn consumption of the change in λ depends on the
interplay between the human wealth effect and the propensity effect. Recall from







It is easy to show that with 0 < σ < 1, the propensity to consume out of human wealth
falls as a result of the reduction in λ:
d∆
dλ
= (1− σ)∆2 ·
∫ D¯
0
M (s) e−(1−σ)[rs+λM(s)]−σ[ρs+M(s)]ds > 0. (4.27)





= − (1− θ)
∫ R
0







M (s) e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds < 0. (4.28)
A decrease in λ results in a reduction in the annuity rate of interest at all age levels
and thus an increase in human wealth due to less severe discounting of non-asset in-
2Consumption peaks at age uˆ, which is defined implicitly by µ(uˆ) = (r− ρ) / (1− λ). Since µ′ (u) > 0 we
find that dµˆ/dλ > 0 and dµˆ/d (r− ρ) > 0. Hence, the smaller is λ or r − ρ, the lower is the age at which
consumption peaks. Note that whereas λ can help determine the location of the kink, the intertemporal
substitution elasticity σ cannot do so.
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come streams. Human wealth is also affected by two of the macroeconomic variables,
namely transfers z and the growth rate g (note that n, ζ, and w (t) /k (t) are not affected








e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds > 0, (4.29)















se−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds > 0. (4.30)
The results in Table 2(b) confirm that for our parameterization scaled consump-
tion and human wealth both increase, i.e. the effects in (4.28) and (4.29) dominate the
combined propensity effect (4.27) and growth effect (4.30).
In Figure 1 the dashed lines depict the life-cycle profiles associated with the model
featuring imperfect annuities. Scaled consumption is hump-shaped but peaks at a
rather high age.3 The profiles for scaled financial assets, wages, and pension payments
are all very similar to the ones for the core model.
4.3 Ageing: the big picture
In this section we put our model to work on the big policy issue of demographic
change. Population ageing remains one of the key issues in economic policy in the
Netherlands. During the 2010 Dutch parliamentary election campaign numerous par-
ties went so far as to call future policy on pensions and the retirement age a breaking
point for the post-electoral coalition scramble. In this section we look at the big pic-
ture and study the effect of ageing and demographic change on the steady-state rate
of economic growth of a country.4
3 Bu¨tler (2001) and Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2008) also find that the hump occurs too late in life. Alessie
and de Ree (2009, p. 113) decompose Dutch consumption into durables and non-durables. They find that
non-durable consumption peaks at age 45 whereas durable consumption reaches its maximum at about age
41.
4 For an accessible survey of the literature on the topic of population ageing and economic growth, see
Bloom et al. (2008). Recent contributions using the endogenous growth framework include Fouge`re and
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Figure 4.1. Life-cycle profiles and the role of annuity imperfections





































































We start our analysis with some stylized facts for the Netherlands.5 In the period
2005-10 the crude birth rate is about β = 1.13% per annum whereas for 2035-40 it is
projected to change to β = 1.05% per annum. The population growth rates are, respec-
tively, pi = 0.41% per annum for 2005-10 and pi = −0.01% per annum 2035-40. Finally,
the old-age dependency ratio is, respectively 23% in 2010 and 46% in 2040. We wish
to simulate our model using a demographic shock which captures the salient features
of these stylized facts. Since we restrict attention to steady-state comparisons in this
paper, we make the strong assumption that the country finds itself in a demographic
steady state both at present and in 2040.
4.3.1 A demographic shock
The demographic shock that we study is as follows.6 First, we assume that the popula-
tion growth rate changes from pi0 = 0.5% to pi1 = 0% per annum. Second, we use our
estimated demographic process (4.8) but change the η1 parameter in such away that an
old-age dependency ratio of 46% is obtained. Writing e−Mi(u) ≡ (ηˆ0 − e
η1,iu) / (ηˆ0 − 1)
















ln η0. Using this expression we find that η1 changes from η1,0 =
ηˆ1 = 0.0680 to η1,1 = 0.0581. The associated values for the crude birth rate are obtained
by imposing the suitably modified demographic steady-state condition. We find that β
changes in the model from β0 = 0.0204 to β1 = 0.0151. Figure 2(a) shows that the new
instantaneous mortality profile shifts to the right. Figure 2(b) illustrates the change
in the population composition. In the new steady state, the population distribution
features less mass at lower ages and more at higher ages, i.e. the population pyramid
becomes narrower and higher.
Me´rette (1999), Futagami and Nakajima (2001), Heijdra and Romp (2006), and Prettner (2009).
5 These figures are taken from United Nations,World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Data
Base, http://esa.un.org/unpp. We use data for the medium variant.
6 In this chapter we focus on demographic changes induced by a change in the mortality rate. When we
return to the analysis of demographic changes in Chapter 6 we study how demographic changes induced
by a change in the birth rate differ from demographic changes induced by a change in the mortality rate.
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The effect on the economic growth rate of the demographic shock depends criti-
cally on the type of pension system. We consider three scenarios. In the first scenario
the pension system is DC, the contribution rate and retirement age are kept constant
(θ0 = 0.07 and R0 = 47), pension payments to the elderly are reduced to balance the
budget of the PAYG system. Columns (c)–(d) in Table 2 report the results for the two
cases with perfect (PA) and imperfect annuities (PA). Since the effects are qualitatively
the same for PA and IA, we restrict attention to the latter case. Comparing columns
(b) and (d) several features stand out. First, the ageing shock has a large effect on the
supply of (efficiency units of) labour, i.e. n falls by more than fifteen percent. This
is an obvious consequence of the fact that the population proportion of working-age
persons declines. Second, the pension payments to retirees are almost halved. Third,
notwithstanding the decrease in pensions, scaled consumption and human wealth at
birth both increase dramatically. More people expect to survive into retirement and,
once retired, the period of retirement is also increased. Fourth, the macroeconomic
growth rate increases dramatically, from 1.91% to 3.27% per annum. The intuition be-
hind this strong growth effect can be explained with the aid of Figure 3. The solid lines
represents the core case of Table 2(b) and the dashed lines illustrate the results from
Table 2(d). Following the demographic shock scaled consumption is uniformly higher
and peaks at a later age. Scaled financial assets are somewhat lower during youth but
much higher thereafter. As Figure 3(b) shows there is a huge savings response which
explains the large increase in the macroeconomic growth rate. In conclusion, of the
main growth channels identified by Bloom et al. (2008, p. 2), labour supply falls (and
thus retards growth) but the capital accumulation effect is so strong as to lead to a
strong positive effect of longevity on economic growth.
In the second scenario the pension system is DB, the pension payments and retire-
ment age are kept constant (ζ0 = 0.3632 and R0 = 47), and pension contributions by
the young are increased to balance the budget of the PAYG system. Columns (e)–(f) in
Table 2 give the results for this case. Comparing columns (b), (d) and (f) the following
features stand out. First, the contribution rate increase is quite substantial, it almost
doubles from θ0 = 0.07 to θ1 = 0.1394. Second, though scaled consumption, scaled
human wealth, and the economic growth rate are higher than in the base case, they are
lower than under the DC scenario. As Figure 3 shows, the capital accumulation effect
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Figure 4.2. Demographic shock
(a) instantaneous mortality rate (b) relative cohort size
µ(u) βe−piu−M(u)



























of the longevity shock is substantially dampened under a DB system. Intuitively, by
taking from the young and giving to the old the PAYG system redistributes from net
savers to net dissavers.
Finally, in the third scenario both θ and ζ are kept at their pre-shock levels and
the retirement age is increased to balance the budget of the PAYG system. Columns
(g)–(h) in Table 2 give the results for this case. Comparing columns (b), (d), (f), and
(h) the following features stand out. First, under the retirement age (RA) scenario
the longevity shock necessitates an increase in the biological retirement age 65 to 75.3
years. i.e. the value of R restoring budget balance changes from R0 = 47 to R1 = 57.3.
Second, compared to the DB and DC cases, labour supply increases strongly in the RA
scenario. Third, the economic growth rate, though still higher than in the base case,
is slightly lower that under DB and much lower than under DC. The intuition behind
this result is clear from Figure 3(b) which shows that the savings response following
the longevity shock is lower than either DB or DC.
The negative relationship between the retirement age and economic growth is sur-
prising in light of the current (Dutch) policy debate in which an increase of the re-
tirement age has become the paradigm for weathering the generational storm (see,
for instance, Bovenberg and Gradus (2008)). This finding, however, fits well with the
analysis of Bloom et al. (2007) who show that the recent increase in adult mortality
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has increased the savings rate in countries where the pension system contains a strong
incentive to retire at the early eligibility age.7
The contrast between the findings from the literature and the policy debate is that
the policy debate is predominantly occupied with the sustainability of government fi-
nances, which have come under pressure due to the additional influx of elderly into
the receiving end of public pensions. The question arises whether the improvement
of government finances due to an increase in the retirement age is not simply bought
against a decreased incentive to save? We leave this interesting trade-off between gov-
ernment finances and the savings rate as an issue for future research because our cur-
rent model is not equipped to give a compelling answer. However, we do emphasize
that the analysis in this chapter highlights the fact that focusing solely on the sustain-
ability of government finances may induce a policy with adverse long-run repercus-
sions.
4.3.2 Robustness
The clear message emerging from the discussion so far is that the type of pension
system in place has a quantitatively large influence on the link between longevity and
macroeconomic growth. Indeed, the same longevity shock can either lead to a huge
increase in growth (under DC) or only a modest increase (under RA). But how robust
are these conclusions? As is pointed out by Bloom et al. (2008, p. 3), “population data
are not sacrosanct” and UN predictions are revised substantially over time. In short,
our stylized demographic facts may be more like “factoids”.8
We study the robustness issue in Table 3. We restrict attention to the case with
imperfect annuities, and column (a) in the table represents the base case. It coincides
with the pre-shock steady state reported in Table 3(b). Columns (b)–(c) in Table 3 report
the results under the DC scenario for alternative demographic shocks. In contrast,
columns (d)-(e) show how a much more broadly defined PAYG system reacts to the
original demographic shock under DC, DB, and RA.
7 In accordance with our other findings Bloom et al. (2007) also find that positive impact of ageing on
economic growth is mitigated if a PAYG system with high benefits is in place.
8De Waegenaere et al. (2010) provide a survey of the recent literature on longevity risk (i.e. the risk that
mortality predictions turn out to be wrong). In accordance with Bloom et al. (2008) they show that estimates
on future mortality rates differ substantially and depend on a plethora of uncertain factors.
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In column (b) we assume that the old-age dependency ratio is 30% rather than 46%
in 2040. As in the original shock we continue to assume that pi1 = 0% per annum. By
using (4.31) we obtain new values for the demographic parameters, i.e. η1,1 = 0.0662
and β1 = µ¯1 = 0.0172. The alternative demographic shock causes a small increase in
the economic growth rate. Whereas the original demographic shock caused growth
to increase from 1.91% to 3.27% per annum (See Table 2, columns (b) and (d)), the
alternative one only raises the growth rate to 2.33% per annum. The alternative ageing
shock is relatively small, and pensions are reduced much less drastically than under
the original demographic shock. The private savings response is quite small as a result.
In column (c) we keep the dependency ratio at 46% but assume that the population
growth rate is 0.5% rather than 0% per annum in 2040. Under this assumption the de-
mographic parameters are equal to η1,1 = 0.0540, β1 = 0.0168, and µ¯1 = 0.0118. This
type of demographic shock produces a huge increase in the macroeconomic growth
rate. The intuition is the same as before – see the discussion relating to Table 2(d)
above. The large growth effect is all the more surprising in view of the growth equa-
tion (T1.6) which directly features −pi on the right-hand side. So even though the
demographic shock itself retards growth by 0.5% per annum, the huge private savings
response more than compensates for this effect.
In conclusion, the two alternative demographic shocks give rise to qualitatively the
same predictions as we obtained for the original shock. Under a DC system economic
growth is boosted because the labour supply effect is strongly dominated by the capital
accumulation effect.
As a final robustness check we investigate whether the size of the PAYG system in-
fluences the relationship between longevity and economic growth. We return to the
original demographic shock featuring pi1 = 0.05% per annum and an old-age depen-
dency ratio of 46% (η1,1 = 0.0581 and β1 = 0.0151). As was pointed out by Broer (2001,
p. 89), “in an ageing society, both the health insurance system and the pension system
impose an increasing burden on households. . . . Thus as the share of elderly in the
population grows, the contribution base [of the public health insurance system, JM]
shrinks at the same time when demand for health care increases.” In short, it can be
argued that the public health insurance system itself contains elements of a PAYG type,
i.e. it taxes the young (and healthy) and provides resources to the old (and infirm).
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Figure 4.3. Life-cycle profiles before and after the demographic shock




































Whereas it is beyond the scope of the present paper to fully model the health in-
surance system, we take from Broer’s analysis the idea that the PAYG system may be
broader than just the public pension system itself. We study the quantitative conse-
quences of PAYG system size in columns (d)–(g) in Table 3. Column (d) shows what
happens to the initial steady-state economy if the contribution rate is increased from
θ0 = 0.07 to θ1 = 0.15. The comparison between columns (a) and (d) reveals that there
is a huge drop in the growth rate, from g = 1.91% to g = 1.19% per annum. Intuitively
the larger PAYG system takes more from the young and gives more to the old. This
chokes off private savings and retards economic growth.
Columns (e)–(g) in Table 3 shows the effects of the original demographic shock
under DC, DB, and RA. The growth increases under all scenarios with the largest effect
occurring under the DC system. Interestingly, whereas the growth effect was smallest
for the RA case in the original model with the narrowly defined PAYG system, for a
large PAYG system it is smallest for the DB scenario.
4.3.3 Limitations
A few words of caution are in place when interpreting our conclusions. There are sev-







4 Table 4.3. Alternative scenarios
Initial PAYG system Large PAYG system
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
DC DC DC DB RA
C (v, v)
w (v)
0.8609 0.9268 1.0971 0.7047 0.8818 0.6109 0.7678
H (v, v)
w (v)
27.0207 29.4510 38.0243 22.1187 29.6744 20.5594 25.8384
g (%) 1.91 2.33 3.43 1.19 2.59 1.51 1.71
n 0.9675 0.9217 0.8155 0.9675 0.8212 0.8212 0.9589
w (t)
k (t)
0.2894 0.3038 0.3434 0.2894 0.3410 0.3410 0.2920
c (t)
w (t)
1.0570 1.0094 0.8465 1.0817 0.8918 0.9236 1.0715
ζ 0.3632 0.2796 0.1812 0.7783 0.3910 0.7783 0.7783
z 0.0200 0.0200 0.0111 0.0174 0.0130 0.0120 0.0148
θ 0.2986
R+ 18 75.3
Notes. Column (a) is the core model with imperfect annuities (column (b) in Table 2). Column (b) dependency ratio in 2040 equal to 30% instead
of 46%. Column (c) population growth rate in 2040 equal to 0.5% instead of 0% per annum. Column (d) bigger PAYG system (θ = 0.15). Columns
(e)–(f) show the effects of the original demographic shock for the large PAYG system under DC and DB. Column (g) leaves θ and ζ unchanged
and features a higher retirement age.
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siderations prevent us from studying the transitional dynamics of a longevity shock.
Although we find that in the steady state a longevity shock has beneficial effects on
growth, it need not be the case that transition is monotonic. Second, we have merely
analyzed growth but not individual welfare. However, as we assume exogenous labour
supply, higher growth automatically translates into higher welfare because discounted
income of individuals increases. Third, we have assumed that labour supply and the
retirement age are exogenous. We have chosen this approach here in order to keep
the model as simple as possible. Indeed, endogenization of both the hours decision
over the life cycle and/or the retirement date is fairly straightforward – see e.g. Heij-
dra and Romp (2009) and Chapter 2 and 3 above. Fourth, we have ignored aggregate
risk and the risk-sharing properties of pension systems. The interested reader is re-
ferred to Bovenberg and Uhlig (2008) who apply a two-period stochastic overlapping
generations model featuring endogenous growth to study the consequences of par-
ticular pension systems on risk-sharing between generations. Finally, we have stud-
ied a closed economy. This is not a convincing representation of the Dutch economy
which is extremely open and small in world markets. However, aging is a global phe-
nomenon. Hence, to model a small open economy with fixed factor prices is equally
unconvincing. Here we have chosen the closed economy framework to zoom in on the
global consequences of ageing on capital accumulation and economic growth – the big
picture.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we apply the model developed in the previous chapters to study the
relationship between aging and economic growth and the mediating role that govern-
ment policy has on this relationship. We find that, in principle, aging increases the
economic growth rate. However, if a defined benefit system is in place the growth
effect weakens somewhat because of the increase in the contribution rate necessary to
finance the additional pensioners. In order to circumvent this adverse effect on the
growth rate, the government might consider to switch to a defined contribution sys-
tem or to increase the retirement age. Surprisingly, we find that the latter policy option
has adverse effects on the economy.
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This chapter completes the analysis of various economic issues based on the model
developed in Chapter 2. In the initial chapter we set out to analyse what the impact is
of imperfect annuity markets on individual decisions and macroeconomic outcomes.
In further analysis we found that the model is very versatile and can be used to study
two important issues at the forefront of economic policy making. In Chapter 3 we ap-
plied to model to issues of taxation and in Chapter 4 to an analysis of pension systems.
In the next chapter we return to the issue of annuities by asking whether opening up
an annuity market is also welfare enhancing from the macroeconomic perspective. In
Chapter 6 we close the analysis by returning to the issue of demographic change and
study how different sources of demographic change affect the aggregate capital stock.
